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1. Introduction
Any expert on financial crises in emerging markets could cite ample
anecdotal evidence to support the view that macroeconomic policies
are highly procyclical, at least in moments of extreme duress. At the
time that economic activity is contracting (often markedly) amidst a
crisis, the fiscal authority cuts budgets deficits while the central bank
raises interest rates—possibly exacerbating the economic contraction.
Procyclical policies, however, do not appear to be limited to crisis peri-
ods in many developing countries. In fact, the roots of most of the debt
crises in emerging markets are all too often found in governments that
go through bouts of high spending and borrowing when the times are
favorable and international capital is plentiful.
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Gavin and Perotti (1997) first called attention to the phenomenon of
procyclical fiscal policy by showing that fiscal policy in Latin America
tends to be expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad
times. Talvi and Vegh (2000) argued that, far from being a phenome-
non peculiar to Latin America, procyclical fiscal policy seems to be the
norm in the developing world just as fiscal policy is acyclical in the
advanced economies. Using a different econometric approach, Braun
(2001) reaches a similar conclusion for developing countries, though he
finds evidence that fiscal policy is countercyclical in OECD countries.
Lane (2003) also provides evidence on the procyclical nature of fiscal
policy in developing countries compared to OECD countries.
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the procyclical
nature of fiscal policy in developing countries compared to indus-
trial countries. Gavin and Perotti (1997), among others, have argued12 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
that developing countries face credit constraints that prevent them
from borrowing in bad times. Hence, they are "forced" to repay in bad
times, which requires a contractionary fiscal policy. In contrast, Tornell
and Lane (1999) develop a political economy model in which competi-
tion for a common pool of funds among different units (ministries,
provinces) leads to the so-called voracity effect, whereby expenditure
could actually exceed a given windfall. Taking as given such a political
distortion, Talvi and Vegh (2000) show how policymakers would find
it optimal to run smaller primary surpluses in good times by increas-
ing government spending and reducing tax rates. Last, Riascos and
Vegh (2003) show how incomplete markets could explain procyclical
fiscal policy as the outcome of a Ramsey problem without having to
impose any additional frictions.
In terms of monetary policy, the impression certainly exists that
developing countries often tighten the monetary strings in bad times
(see Lane, 2003), but systematic empirical work is scant.
2 This is proba-
bly due to the notorious difficulties (present even for advanced coun-
tries) in empirically characterizing the stance of monetary policy.
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Relying on data for 104 countries for the period 1960-2003, this pa-
per revisits the evidence on the procyclical nature of fiscal policy and,
as far as we know, presents a first systematic effort to document empir-
ically the cyclical properties of monetary policy in developing coun-
tries. It departs from earlier efforts investigating fiscal policy cycles in
several dimensions. First, it provides an analytical framework for inter-
preting the behavior of a broad variety of fiscal indicators, which leads
to a reinterpretation of some earlier results in the literature. Second, it
analyzes countries grouped by income levels to capture the fact that
while wealthier countries have continuous access to international capi-
tal markets, low-income countries are almost exclusively shut out at
all times, and middle-income countries have a precarious and volatile
relationship with international capital. Third, it examines closely the
interaction among the business cycle, international capital flows, and
macroeconomic policy.
4 Our premise is that the capital flow cycle is
tied to the business cycle and may even influence macroeconomic poli-
cies, particularly in middle income countries. Fourth, it offers an eclec-
tic approach toward defining good and bad times and measuring the
stance of fiscal and monetary policy by employing a broad range of
indicators. Fifth, it disaggregates the sample along a variety of dimen-
sions, by (1) differentiating crises episodes from tranquil periods, (2)
treating the more rigid exchange rate arrangements separately fromWhen It Rains, It Pours 13
the more flexible ones, and (3) comparing earlier and more recent peri-
ods to assess whether the degree of capital market integration has
altered cyclical patterns and relationships. Last, the analysis offers
more comprehensive country coverage than earlier efforts.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the under-
lying conceptual framework used to interpret the data on capital flows
and fiscal and monetary policy, and describes the approach followed
to define business cycles. Section 3 presents a broad view of our main
findings; Section 4 provides greater detail on the main stylized facts
by grouping countries according to income per-capita levels, type of
exchange rate arrangement, and other relevant subsamples. Section 5
contains concluding remarks.
2. Conceptual Framework
This section lays out the conceptual framework used to interpret our
empirical findings in the following sections. Specifically, we will dis-
cuss how to think about the cyclical properties of capital flows, fiscal
policy, and monetary policy. A thorough reading of the blossoming lit-
erature on the cyclical nature of policy in developing countries reveals
a somewhat loose approach to defining basic concepts, which often
renders the discussion rather imprecise. For instance, countercyclical
fiscal policy is often defined as running fiscal deficits in bad times
and surpluses in good times (i.e., as a positive correlation between
changes in output and changes in the fiscal balance). As we will argue,
however, this is an unfortunate way of defining the concept since
running a fiscal deficit in bad times may be consistent with rather dif-
ferent approaches to fiscal stabilization. In the same vein, considering
fiscal variables as a proportion of GDP—as is most often done in this
literature—could yield misleading results since the cyclical stance of
fiscal policy may be dominated by the cyclical behavior of output.
In light of these critical conceptual issues—and at the risk of perhaps
appearing sometimes obvious—we will be very specific as to how we
define countercyclicality, procyclicality, and acyclicality.
2.1 Capital Flows
We define the cyclical properties of capital flows as follows (Table 1):
1. Capital flows into a country are said to be countercyclical when the
correlation between the cyclical components of net capital inflows and14 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
Table 1
Capital flows: theoretical correlations with the business cycle





output is negative. In other words, the economy borrows from abroad
in bad times (i.e., capital flows in) and lends/repays in good times (i.e.,
capital flows out).
2. Capital flows are procyclical when the correlation between the cycli-
cal components of net capital inflows and output is positive. The econ-
omy thus borrows from abroad in good times (i.e., capital flows in)
and lends/repays in bad times (i.e., capital flows out).
3. Capital flows are acyclical when the correlation between the cyclical
components of net capital inflows and output is not statistically signifi-
cant. The pattern of international borrowing and lending is thus not
systematically related to the business cycle.
While this may appear self-evident, the mapping between the cycli-
cal properties of net capital inflows as a share of GDP (a commonly
used measure) and the business cycle is not clear cut. As the second
column of Table 1 indicates, in the case of countercyclical capital
inflows, this ratio should also have a negative correlation with output
since in good (bad) times, net capital inflows fall (increase) and GDP
increases (fall). In the case of procyclical net capital inflows, however,
this ratio could have any sign since in good (bad) times, net capital
inflows increase (fall) and GDP also increases (falls). In the acyclical
case, the behavior of the ratio is dominated by the changes in GDP
and therefore has a negative correlation. Thus, the ratio of net capital
inflows to GDP will only provide an unambiguous indication of the
cyclicality of net capital inflows if it has a positive sign (or is zero) in
which case it would be indicating procylical capital flows. If it has a
negative sign, however, it does not allow us to discriminate among the
three cyclical patterns.
Our definition of the cyclical properties of capital flows thus focuses
on whether capital flows tend to reinforce or stabilize the business
cycle. To fix ideas, consider the standard endowment model of a smallWhen It Rains, It Pours 15
open economy (with no money). In the absence of any intertemporal
distortion, households want to keep consumption flat over time. Thus,
in response to a temporary negative endowment shock, the economy
borrows from abroad to sustain the permanent level of consumption.
During good times, the economy repays its debt. Saving is thus posi-
tively correlated with the business cycle. Hence, in the standard model
with no investment, capital inflows are countercyclical and tend to sta-
bilize the cycle. Naturally, the counterpart of countercyclical borrow-
ing in the standard real model is a procyclical current account.
Conversely, if the economy borrowed during good times and lent
during bad times, capital flows would be procyclical because they
would tend to reinforce the business cycle. In this case, the counter-
part would be a countercyclical current account. Plausible theoretical
explanations for procyclical capital flows include the following. First,
suppose that physical capital is added to the basic model described
above and that the business cycle is driven by productivity shocks.
Then, a temporary and positive productivity shock would lead to an
increase in saving (for the consumption smoothing motives described
above) and to an increase in investment (as the return on capital has
increased). If the investment effect dominates, then borrowing would
be procyclical because the need to finance profitable investment more
than offsets the saving effect.
A second explanation—particularly relevant for emerging coun-
tries—would result from intertemporal distortions in consumption
imposed by temporary policies (like inflation stabilization programs
or temporary liberalization policies; see Calvo, 1987; Calvo and Vegh,
1999). An unintended consequence of such temporary policies is to
make consumption relatively cheaper during good times (by reducing
the effective price of consumption), thus leading to a consumption
boom that is financed by borrowing from abroad. In this case, saving
falls in good times, which renders capital flows procyclical.
5
A third possibility—also relevant for emerging countries—is that
the availability of international capital varies with the business cycle.
If foreign investors respond to the evidence of an improving local
economy by bidding down country risk premiums (perhaps encour-
aged by low interest rates at financial centers), residents of the small
economy may view this as a temporary opportunity to finance con-
sumption cheaply and therefore dissave.
6 We should remember that
the consumption booms financed by capital inflows in many emerging
market economies in the first part of the 1990s were seen at the time as16 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
an example of the capital inflow problem, as in Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart (1993,1994).
Finally, notice that, in practice, movements in international reserves
could break the link between procyclical borrowing and current ac-
count deficits (or countercyclical borrowing and current account sur-
pluses) that would arise in the basic real intertemporal model. Indeed,
recall the basic balance of payments accounting identity:
Change in international reserves
= current account balance + capital account balance
Hence, positive net capital inflows (a capital account surplus) would
not necessarily be associated with a negative current account balance
if international reserves were increasing. Therefore, the cyclical proper-
ties of the current account are an imperfect indicator of those of capital
flows.
2.2 Fiscal Policy
Since the concept of policy cyclically is important to the extent that it
can help us understand or guide actual policy, it makes sense to define
policy cyclically in terms of policy instruments as opposed to out-
comes (i.e., endogenous variables). Hence, we will define the cyclical-
ity of fiscal policy in terms of government spending (g) and tax rates
(T) (instead of defining it in terms of, say, the fiscal balance or tax reve-
nues). Given this definition, we will then examine the cyclical implica-
tions for important endogenous variables such as the primary fiscal
balance, tax revenues, and fiscal variables as a proportion of GDP. We
define fiscal policy cyclically as follows (see Table 2):
1. A countercyclical fiscal policy involves lower (higher) government
spending and higher (lower) tax rates in good (bad) times. We call
Table 2
Fiscal indicators: theoretical correlations with the business cycle
Tax Primary
Tax Primary revenues/ balance/
g T revenues balance g/GDP GDP GDP
Countercyclical - + + + - -/0/+ -/0/+
Procyclical + - -/0/+ -/0/+ -/0/+ -/0/+ -/0/+
Acyclical 0 0+ + - -/0/+ -/0/+When It Rains, It Pours 17
such a policy countercyclical because it would tend to stabilize the
business cycle (i.e., fiscal policy is contractionary in good times and
expansionary in bad times).
2. A procyclical fiscal policy involves higher (lower) government
spending and lower (higher) tax rates in good (bad) times. We call
such a policy procyclical because it tends to reinforce the business cycle
(i.e., fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in
bad times).
7
3. An acyclical fiscal policy involves constant government spending
and constant tax rates over the cycle (or more precisely, for the case of
a stochastic world, government spending and tax rates do not vary
systematically with the business cycle). We call such a policy acyclical
because it neither reinforces nor stabilizes the business cycle.
The correlations implied by these definitions are shown in the first two
columns of Table 2.
We next turn to the implications of these cyclical definitions of fiscal
policy for the behavior of tax revenues, the primary fiscal balance, and
government expenditure, tax revenues, and primary balance as a pro-
portion of GDP.
8 In doing so, we will make use of the following two
definitions:
Tax revenues = tax rate x tax base
Primary balance = tax revenues — government expenditures
(excluding interest payments)
Consider first an acyclical fiscal policy. Since the tax rate is constant
over the cycle and the tax base increases in good times and falls in bad
times, tax revenues will have a positive correlation with the business
cycle. This, in turn, implies that the primary balance will also be posi-
tively correlated with the cycle. The ratio of government expenditure
(net of interest payments) to GDP will be negatively correlated with
the cycle because government expenditure does not vary and, by defi-
nition, GDP is high (low) in good (bad) times. Given that tax revenues
are higher (lower) in good (bad) times, the correlation of the ratio of
tax revenues to GDP with the cycle is ambiguous (i.e., it could be posi-
tive, zero, or negative, as indicated in Table 2). As a result, the correla-
tion of the primary balance as a proportion of GDP with the cycle will
also be ambiguous.18 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
Consider procyclical fiscal policy. Since by definition the tax rate
goes down (up) in good (bad) times but the tax base moves in the op-
posite direction, the correlation of tax revenues with the cycle is ambig-
uous. Since g goes up in good times, the correlation of g/GDP can, in
principle, take on any value. Given the ambiguous cyclical behavior of
tax revenues, the cyclical behavior of tax revenues as a proportion of
GDP is also ambiguous. The behavior of the primary balance as a pro-
portion of GDP will also be ambiguous.
Last, consider countercyclical fiscal policy. By definition, tax rates
are high in good times and low in bad times, which implies that tax
revenues vary positively with the cycle. The same is true of the pri-
mary balance since tax revenues increase (fall) and government spend-
ing falls (increases) in good (bad) times. The ratio g/GDP will vary
negatively with the cycle because g falls (increases) in good (bad)
times. Since tax revenues increase in good times, the behavior of tax
revenues as a proportion of GDP will be ambiguous and, hence, so
will be the behavior of the primary balance as a proportion of GDP.
Several important observations follow from Table 2 regarding the
usefulness of different indicators in discriminating among the three
cases:
1. From a theoretical point of view, the best indicators to look at
would be government spending and tax rates. By definition, these
indicators would clearly discriminate among the three cases. As Table
2 makes clear, no other indicator has such discriminatory power. In
practice, however, there is no systematic data on tax rates (other than
perhaps the inflation tax rate), leaving us with government spending
as the best indicator.
2. The cyclical behavior of tax revenues will be useful only to the ex-
tent that it has a negative or zero correlation with the business cycle.
This would be an unambiguous indication that fiscal policy is procycli-
cal. It would signal a case in which the degree of procyclicality is so ex-
treme that in, say, bad times, the rise in tax rates is so pronounced that
it either matches or dominates the fall in the tax base.
3. The cyclical behavior of the primary balance will be useful only to
the extent that it has a negative or zero correlation with the business
cycle. This would be an unambiguous indication that fiscal policy is
procyclical. It would indicate a case in which, in good times, the rise in
government spending either matches or more than offsets a possible
increase in tax revenues or a case in which a fall in tax revenues inWhen It Rains, It Pours 19
good times reinforces the effect of higher government spending on the
primary balance. Given our definition of fiscal policy cyclicality, it
would be incorrect to infer that a primary deficit in bad times signals
countercyclical fiscal policy. A primary deficit in bad times is, in princi-
ple, consistent with any of three cases.
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4. The cyclical behavior of the primary balance as a proportion of GDP
will never provide an unambiguous reading of the cyclical stance of
fiscal policy. Most of the literature (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Braun,
2001; Dixon, 2003; Lane, 2003a; and Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel,
2003) has drawn conclusions from looking at this indicator. For in-
stance, Gavin and Perotti (1997) find that the response of the fiscal sur-
plus as a proportion of GDP to a one-percentage-point increase in the
rate of output growth is not statistically different from zero in Latin
America and take this as an indication of procyclical fiscal policy. Cal-
deron and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), in contrast, find a negative effect of
the output gap on deviations of the fiscal balance from its sample mean
and interpret this as countercyclical fiscal policy. Given our definitions,
however, one would not be able to draw either conclusion (as the last
column of Table 2 makes clear).
5. The cyclical behavior of the ratio g/GDP will be useful only to the
extent that it has a positive or zero correlation with the business cycle.
This would be an unambiguous indication that fiscal policy is procycli-
cal. In other words, finding that this ratio is negatively correlated with
the cycle does not allow us to discriminate among the three cases. Once
again, this suggests caution in interpreting some of the existing litera-
ture that relies on this indicator for drawing conclusions.
6. Last, the cyclical behavior of the ratio of tax revenues to GDP will
not be particularly useful in telling us about the cyclical properties of
fiscal policy since its theoretical behavior is ambiguous in all three
cases.
In sum, our discussion suggests that extreme caution should be exer-
cised in drawing conclusions on policy cyclicality based either on the
primary balance or on the primary balance, government spending,
and tax revenues as a proportion of GDP. In light of this, we will rely
only on indicators that, given our definition of procyclicality, provide
an unambiguous measure of the stance of fiscal policy: government
spending and—as a proxy for a tax rate—the inflation tax rate.
1
0
From a theoretical point of view, various models could rationalize
different stances of fiscal policy over the business cycle. Countercyclical20 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
fiscal policy could be rationalized by resorting to a traditional
Keynesian model (in old or new clothes) with an objective function
that penalizes deviations of output from trend since an increase (reduc-
tion) in government spending and/or a reduction (increase) in tax
rates would expand (contract) output. An acyclical fiscal policy could
be rationalized by neoclassical models of optimal fiscal policy that call
for roughly constant tax rates over the business cycle (see Chari and
Kehoe, 1999). If government spending is endogeneized (by, say, pro-
viding direct utility), it would optimally behave in a similar way to pri-
vate consumption and hence would be acyclical in the presence of
complete markets (Riascos and Vegh, 2003). Procyclical fiscal policy
could be rationalized by resorting to political distortions (Tornell and
Lane, 1999; Talvi and Vegh, 2000), borrowing constraints (Gavin and
Perotti, 1997; Aizeman, Gavin, and Hausmann, 1996), or incomplete
markets (Riascos and Vegh, 2003).
2.3 Monetary Policy
Performing the same conceptual exercise for monetary policy is much
more difficult because (1) monetary policy instruments may depend
on the existing exchange rate regime and (2) establishing outcomes
(i.e., determining the behavior of endogenous variables) requires the
use of some (implicit) model.
For our purposes, it is enough to define two exchange rate regimes:
fixed or predetermined exchange rates and flexible exchange rates
(which we define as including any regime in which the exchange rate is
allowed some flexibility). By definition, flexible exchange rate regimes
include relatively clean floats (which are rare) and dirty floats (a more
common type, as documented in Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
Under certain assumptions, a common policy instrument across
these two different regimes would be a short-term interest rate. The
most prominent example is the federal funds rate in the United States,
an overnight interbank interest rate that constitutes the Federal Re-
serve's main policy target. From a theoretical point of view, under flexi-
ble exchange rates, monetary policy can certainly be thought of in
terms of some short-term interest rate since changes in the money sup-
ply will directly influence interest rates. Under fixed or predetermined
exchange rates, the only assumption needed for a short-term interest
rate to also be thought of as a policy instrument is that some imperfect
substitution exist between domestic and foreign assets (see Flood andWhen It Rains, It Pours 21
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Jeanne, 2000; Lahiri and Vegh, 2003). In fact, it is common practice for
central banks to raise some short-term interest rate to defend a fixed
exchange rate.
In principle, then, observing the correlation between a policy-
controlled short-term interest rate and the business cycle would indi-
cate whether monetary policy is countercyclical (the interest rate is
raised in good times and reduced in bad times, implying a positive
correlation), procyclical (the interest rate is reduced in good times and
increased in bad times, implying a negative correlation), or acyclical
(the interest rate is not systematically used over the business cycle,
implying no correlation), as indicated in Table 3.
The expected correlations with other monetary variables are more
complex. In the absence of an active interest rate policy, we expect real
money balances (in terms of any monetary aggregate) to be high in
good times and low in bad times (i.e., positively correlated with the
business cycle), and real interest rates to be lower in good times and
high in bad times (i.e., negatively correlated with the cycle).
1
1 A pro-
cyclical interest rate policy would reinforce this cyclical pattern.
1
2 A
countercyclical interest rate policy would in principle call for lower
real money balances and higher real interest rates relative to the bench-
mark of no activist policy. In principle, this leaning-against-the wind
policy could be so effective as to render the correlation between real
money balances and output zero or even negative, and the correla-
tion between real interest rates and the cycle zero or even positive (as
indicated in Table 3). In sum—and as Table 3 makes clear—the cyclical
behavior of real money balances and real interest rates will only be in-
formative in a subset of cases:
1. A negative or zero correlation between (the cyclical components
of) real money balances and output would indicate countercyclical22 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
monetary policy. In this case, real money balances would fall in good
times and rise in bad times. In contrast, a positive correlation is, in
principle, consistent with any monetary policy stance.
2. A positive or zero correlation between (the cyclical components of)
the real interest rate and output would indicate countercyclical mone-
tary policy. In this case, policy countercyclicality is so extreme that real
interest rates increase in good times and fall in bad times. In contrast, a
negative correlation is, in principle, consistent with any monetary pol-
icy stance.
In practice, however, even large databases typically carry informa-
tion on overnight or very short-term interest rates for only a small
number of countries. Hence, the interest rates that one observes in
practice are of longer maturities and thus include an endogenous cycli-
cal component (for instance, the changes in inflationary expectations,
term premiums, or risk premiums over the cycle). To the extent that
the inflation rate tends to have a small positive correlation with the
business cycle in industrial countries and a negative correlation with
the business cycle in developing countries, there will be a bias toward
concluding that monetary policy is countercyclical in industrial coun-
tries and procyclical in developing countries. To reduce this bias, we
will choose interbank/overnight rates whenever possible.
A second policy instrument under either regime is the rate of growth
of the central bank's domestic credit. Naturally, how much a given
change in domestic credit will affect the monetary base and hence in-
terest rates will depend on the particular exchange rate regime. Under
predetermined exchange rates and perfect substitution between do-
mestic and foreign assets, the monetary approach to the balance of
payments tells us that the change in domestic credit will be exactly un-
done by an opposite change in reserves. Under imperfect substitution
between domestic and foreign assets, however, an increase in domestic
credit will have some effect on the monetary base. The same is true
under a dirty floating regime, because the change in reserves will
not fully offset the change in domestic credit.
In this context, a countercyclical monetary policy would imply
reducing the rate of domestic credit growth during good times, and
vice versa (i.e., a negative correlation). A procyclical monetary policy
would imply increasing the rate of domestic credit growth during
good times, and vice versa (i.e., a positive correlation). An acyclical












credit over the business cycle.
1
3 Of course, changes in domestic credit
growth can be seen as the counterpart of movements in short-term in-
terest rates, with a reduction (an increase) in domestic credit growth
leading to an increase (reduction) in short-term interest rates.
In addition to computing the correlations indicated in Table 3, we
will attempt to establish whether monetary policy is procyclical, acycl-
ical, or countercyclical by estimating Taylor rules for every country for
which data are available (see Taylor, 1993). Following Clarida, Gall,
and Gertler (1999), our specification takes the form:
it = a. + ^{nt-n)+p2y
ct, (1)
where it is a policy-controlled short-term interest rate; nt — n captures
deviations of actual inflation from its sample average, n, and y
ct is the
output gap, measured as the cyclical component of output (i.e., actual
output minus trend) divided by actual output. The coefficient /?2 in
equation (1) would indicate the stance of monetary policy over the
business cycle (see Table 4) over and above the monetary authority's
concerns about inflation, which are captured by the coefficient fix.
Several remarks are in order regarding equation (1). First, we are
assuming that current inflation is a good predictor of future inflation.
Second, we are assuming that the mean inflation rate is a good repre-
sentation of some implicit/explicit inflation target on the basis that
central banks deliver on average the inflation rate that they desire.
Third, given potential endogeneity problems, the relation captured in
equation (1) is probably best interpreted as a long-run cointegrating re-
lationship. Fourth, since our estimation will be based on annual data,
equation (1) does not incorporate the possibility of gradual adjust-
ments of the nominal interest rate to some target interest rate. Fifth,
by estimating equation (1), we certainly do not mean to imply that
every country in our sample has followed some type of Taylor rule
throughout the sample. Rather, we see it as a potentially useful way of24 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
characterizing the correlation between a short-term interest rate and
the output gap once one controls for the monetary authority's implicit
or explicit inflation target.
By now, numerous studies have estimated Taylor rules, though most
are limited to developed countries. For example, for the United States,
Japan, and Germany, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) report that, in
the post-1979 period, the inflation coefficient is significantly above 1
(indicating that in response to a rise in expected inflation, central banks
raised nominal rates enough to raise real rates) and the coefficient on
the output gap is significantly positive except for the United States. In
other words—and using the terminology spelled out in Table 4—since
1979 Japan and Germany have pursued countercyclical monetary pol-
icy (lowering interest rates in bad times and increasing them in good
times), but monetary policy in the United States has been acyclical. In
the pre-1979 period, however, the Federal Reserve also pursued coun-
tercyclical monetary policy (see Clarida, Gertler, and Gali, 1999). For
Peru, Moron and Castro (2000) use the change in the monetary base as
the dependent variable and add an additional term involving the devi-
ation of the real exchange rate from trend; they find that monetary
policy is countercyclical. For Chile, Corbo (2000) finds that monetary
policy does not respond to output (i.e., is acyclical).
In terms of the theoretical literature, there has been extensive work
on how to theoretically derive Taylor-type rules in the context of
Keynesian models (see, for example, Clarida, Gertler, and Gali, 1999).
This literature would rationalize countercyclical monetary policy on
the basis that increases (decreases) in the output gap call for higher
(lower) short-term interest rates to reduce (boost) aggregate demand.
Acyclical monetary policy could be rationalized in terms of neoclassi-
cal models of optimal monetary policy which call for keeping the nom-
inal interest rate close to zero (see Chari and Kehoe, 1999). Collection
costs for conventional taxes could optimally explain a positive—but
still constant over the cycle—level of nominal interest rates (see Calvo
and Vegh, 1999 and the references therein). Some of the stories put for-
ward to explain procyclical fiscal policy mentioned above could also be
used to explain procyclical monetary policy if the nominal interest rate
is part of the policy set available to the Ramsey planner. Nonfiscal-
based explanations for procyclical monetary policy might include the
need for defending the domestic currency under flexible exchange
rates (Lahiri and Vegh, 2004)—which in bad times would call for
higher interest rates to prevent the domestic currency from depreciat-When It Rains, It Pours 25
ing further—and models in which higher interest rates may provide
a signal of the policymaker's intentions (see Drazen, 2000). In these
models, establishing credibility in bad times may call for higher inter-
est rates.
2.4 Measuring Good and Bad Times
Not all advanced economies have as clearly defined business cycle
turning points as those established by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) for the United States. For developing econo-
mies, where quarterly data for the national income accounts is at best
recent and most often nonexistent, even less is known about economic
fluctuations and points of inflexion. Thus, to pursue our goal of assess-
ing the cyclical stance of capital flows and macroeconomic policies,
we must develop some criterion that breaks down economic condi-
tions into good and bad times. Taking an eclectic approach to sort
out this issue, we will follow three different techniques: a nonpara-
metric approach and two filtering techniques commonly used in the
literature.
The nonparametric approach consists in dividing the sample into
episodes where annual real GDP growth is above the median (good
times) and those times where growth falls below the median (bad
times). The relevant median or cutoff point is calculated on a country-
by-country basis. We then compute the amplitude of the cycle in differ-
ent variables by comparing the behavior of the variable in question in
good and bad times. We should notice that, although growth below
the median need not signal a recession, restricting the definition of re-
cession to involve only periods where GDP growth is negative is too
narrow a definition of bad times for countries with rapid population
growth (which encompasses the majority of our sample), or rapid pro-
ductivity growth, or countries that have seldom experienced a reces-
sion by NBER standards. This approach is appealing because it is
nonparametric and free from the usual estimation problems that arise
when all the variables in question are potentially endogenous.
The other two approaches consist of decomposing each time series
into its stochastic trend and cyclical component using two popular
filters—the ubiquitous Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and the bandpass
filter developed in Baxter and King (1999). After decomposing each se-
ries into its trend and cyclical component, we report a variety of pair-
wise correlations among the cyclical components of GDP, net capital26 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
inflows, and fiscal and monetary indicators for each of the four in-
come groups. These correlations are used to establish contemporane-
ous comovements, but a fruitful area for future research would be to
analyze potential temporal causal patterns.
3. The Big Picture
This section presents a visual overview of the main stylized facts that
we have uncovered, leaving the more detailed analysis of the results
for the following sections.
1
4 Our aim here is to contrast OECD and
developing (i.e., non-OECD) countries, and synthesize our findings
in terms of key stylized facts. It is worth stressing that we are not try-
ing to identify underlying structural parameters or shocks that may
give rise to these empirical regularities, but merely trying to uncover
reduced-form correlations hidden in the data. Our findings can be
summarized in terms of four stylized facts.
Stylized fact 1. Net capital inflows are procyclical in most OECD and
developing countries.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the correlation between
the cyclical components of net capital inflows and GDP. As the
plot makes clear, most countries exhibit a positive correlation, indicat-




Country correlations between the cyclical components of net capital inflows and real
GDP, 1960-2003
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The cycli-
cal components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive correla-
tion indicates procyclical capital flows.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.When It Rains, It Pours 27
Stylized fact 2. With regard to fiscal policy, OECD countries are, by and
large, either countercyclical or acyclical. In sharp contrast, developing
countries are predominantly procyclical.
Figures 2 through 4 illustrate this critical difference in fiscal policy be-
tween advanced and developing economies. Figure 2 plots the correla-
tion between the cyclical components of real GDP and real government
spending. As is clear from the graph, most OECD countries have a
negative correlation, while most developing countries have a posi-
tive correlation. Figure 3 plots the difference between the percentage
change in real government spending when GDP growth is above the
median (good times) and when it is below the median (bad times).
This provides a measure of the amplitude of the fiscal policy cycle: large
negative numbers suggest that the growth in real government spend-
ing is markedly higher in bad times (and thus policy is strongly coun-
tercyclical), while large positive numbers indicate that the growth in
real government spending is markedly lower in bad times (and thus
policy is strongly procyclical). In our sample, the most extreme case of
procyclicality is given by Liberia, where the growth in real government
spending is 32.4 percentage points higher in good times compared to
bad times. The most extreme cases of countercyclicality are Sudan and
Denmark, where real government spending growth is over 7 percent-
age points lower during expansions. In addition to a more volatile
cycle—and as Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) show for some of the larger
emerging markets—the trend component of output is itself highly
Countries
Figure 2
Country correlations between the cyclical components of real government expenditure
and real GDP, 1960-2003
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The cycli-
cal components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive correla-
tion indicates procyclical fiscal policy. Real government expenditure is defined as central
government expenditure deflated by the GDP deflator.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.28 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
Countries
Figure 3
Amplitude of the fiscal policy cycle, 1960-2003
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The am-
plitude of the fiscal policy cycle is captured by the difference (in percentage points) be-
tween the growth of real government expenditure in good times and bad times. Real
government expenditure is defined as central government expenditure deflated by the
GDP deflator. Good (bad) times are defined as those years in which GDP growth is
above (below) the median. A positive correlation indicates procyclical fiscal policy.











Country correlations between the cyclical components of the inflation tax and real GDP,
1960-2003
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The cycli-
cal components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive correla-
tion indicates countercyclical fiscal policy.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics.When It Rains, It Pours 29
Countries
Figure 5
Country correlations between the cyclical components of the nominal lending interest
rate and real GDP, 1960-2003
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The cycli-
cal components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A positive correla-
tion indicates countercyclical monetary policy.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics.
volatile, which would also be captured in this measure of amplitude.
Finally, Figure 4 plots the correlation between the cyclical components
of output and the inflation tax. A negative correlation indicates pro-
cyclical fiscal policy because it implies that the inflation tax rate is
lower in good times. Figure 4 makes clear that most OECD countries
exhibit a positive correlation (countercyclical policy) while most devel-
oping countries exhibit a negative correlation (procyclical policy).
Stylized fact 3. With regard to monetary policy, most OECD countries are
countercyclical, while developing countries are mostly procyclical or
acyclical.
This is illustrated in Figure 5 for nominal lending rates. This holds
for other nominal interest rates (including various measures of policy
rates), as described in the next section. We plot the lending rate be-
cause it is highly correlated with the policy rates but offers more com-
prehensive data coverage.
Stylized fact 4. In developing countries, the capital flow cycle and the
macroeconomic policy cycle reinforce each other (we dub this positive
relationship as the "when it rains, it pours" phenomenon).
Put differently, macroeconomic policies are expansionary when capital
is flowing in, and they are contractionary when capital is flowing out.
This is illustrated in Figures 6 through 8. Figure 6 shows that most




Country correlations between the cyclical components of real government expenditure
and net capital inflows, 1960-2003
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The cycli-
cal components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Real government
expenditure is defined as central government expenditure deflated by the GDP deflator.





Country correlations between the cyclical components of the inflation tax and net capital
inflows
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The cycli-
cal components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
components of government spending and net capital inflows, but there
does not seem to be an overall pattern for OECD countries. In the same
vein, Figure 7 shows that in developing countries, the correlation be-
tween the cyclical components of net capital inflows and the inflation
tax is mostly negative, while no pattern is apparent for OECD coun-
tries. Last, Figure 8 shows a predominance of negative correlations
between the cyclical components of net capital inflows and the nomi-
nal lending rate for developing countries, suggesting that the capital
flow and the monetary policy cycle reinforce each other. The opposite











Country correlations between the cyclical components of the nominal lending interest
rate and net capital inflows, 1960-2003
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The cycli-
cal components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
4. Further Evidence on Business, Capital Flows, and Policy Cycles
This section examines the four stylized facts presented in the preceding
section in greater depth by looking at alternative definitions of mone-
tary and fiscal policy; using different methods to define the cyclical
patterns in economic activity, international capital flows, and macro-
economic policies; and splitting the sample along several dimensions.
In particular—and as discussed in Section 2—we will use three dif-
ferent approaches to define good and bad times: a nonparametric
approach that allows us to quantify the amplitude of the cycles and two
more standard filtering techniques (the Hodrick-Prescott filter and the
bandpass filter).
4.1 Capital Flows
Tables 5 through 7 present additional evidence on stylized fact 1 (i.e.,
net capital inflows are procyclical in most OECD and developing coun-
tries). Table 5 shows that net capital inflows as a proportion of GDP
tend to be larger in good times than in bad times for all groups of
countries, which indicates procyclical net capital inflows. (Recall from
Table 1 that a positive correlation between capital inflows as a propor-




The decline in capital inflows as a proportion of GDP in bad times is
largest for the middle-high income economies (1.4 percent of GDP).
This should come as no surprise because this group of countries is32 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
Table 5

























Notes: Capital inflows/GDP is expressed in percentage terms. Good (bad) times are
defined as those years in which GDP growth is above (below) the median.



























Good (bad) times are defined as those years in which GDP growth is above (below) the
median.
Sources: Institutional Investor and IMF, World Economic Outlook.
Table 7
International credit ratings and real GDP: descriptive statistics
Countries
Middle-high Middle-low Low
Statistics OECD income income income
Institutional Investor Index: 1979-2003
Coefficient of variation 0.06 0.22 0.23 0.18
Mean 79.9 41.5 32.0 21.8
Real GDP Growth: 1960-2003
Coefficient of variation 0.80 1.20 1.20 1.60
Mean 3.90 4.90 4.70 3.30
Sources: Institutional Investor and IMF, World Economic Outlook.When It Rains, It Pours • 33
Table 8

















Note: An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook.
noted for having on-and-off access to international private capital mar-
kets, partly due to a history of serial default.
1
7
The behavior of international credit ratings, such as the Institutional
Investor Index (III), also provides insights on capital market access.
1
8
As discussed in Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), at very low
ratings (the low-income countries), the probability of default is suffi-
ciently high that countries are entirely shut out of international private
capital markets, while ratings at the high end of the spectrum are a
sign of uninterrupted market access. These observations are borne out
in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 shows that there is essentially no difference
in credit ratings during good and bad times for the wealthy OECD
economies and the low-income countries. The largest difference in rat-
ings across good and bad times is for the middle-income countries,
where ratings are procyclical (i.e., high in good times and low in bad
times).
This U-shaped pattern is also evident in the volatility of the credit
ratings. Table 7 presents basic descriptive statistics for growth and the
Institutional Investor ratings. Not surprisingly, ratings are far more
stable for OECD economies (the coefficient of variation is 0.06), but so
is growth, with a coefficient of variation of 0.8. Despite the fact that
output is the most volatile for the group of low-income economies
(with a coefficient of variation is 1.6, or twice the level of the OECD
group), its international ratings (0.18) are more stable than those of
middle-income countries (with coefficients of variation of 0.22 and
0.23).
Finally, Table 8 presents correlations (using our two different filters)
between the cyclical components of real GDP and net capital inflows.
1
9
The correlations are positive and significant for all four groups of34 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
Table 9




Current expenditure minus interest payments
Expenditure on goods and services
Expenditure on wages and salaries
General or consolidated government:
Expenditure (WEO)
Current expenditure minus interest payments
Inflation tax, n/(l + n)
Central government:
Expenditure (WEO)
Current expenditure minus interest payments
Expenditure on goods and services
Expenditure on wages and salaries
General or consolidated government:
Expenditure (WEO)
Current expenditure minus interest payments
Inflation tax, n/{\ + n)
Central government:
Expenditure (WEO)
Current expenditure minus interest payments
Expenditure on goods and services
Expenditure on wages and salaries
General or consolidated government:
Expenditure (WEO)
Current expenditure minus interest payments
Inflation tax, n/(l + n)
Central government:
Expenditure (WEO)
Current expenditure minus interest payments
Expenditure on goods and services
Expenditure on wages and salaries
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Table 9
(continued)
General or consolidated government:
Expenditure (WEO)
Current expenditure minus interest payments










Notes: All data are from International Monetary Fund, Government Financial Statistics,
unless otherwise noted. The increase for the fiscal spending indicators is the average an-
nual real rate of growth expressed in percentage terms. The inflation tax figure is multi-
plied by one hundred. The increase in the inflation tax denotes the average change in
this indicator. Good (bad) times are defined as those years with GDP growth above (be-
low) the median.
Sources: IMF, Government Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook (WEO).
countries and for both filters. Not surprisingly, the correlations are
the highest for OECD and middle-high income countries and the
lowest for low-income countries. These results thus strongly support
the idea that capital inflows are indeed procyclical for both industrial
and developing countries.
4.2 Fiscal Policy
With regard to Stylized fact 2 (i.e., fiscal policy in OECD countries is, by
and large, either countercyclical or acyclical, while in developing coun-
tries fiscal policy is predominantly procyclical), Table 9 provides a
measure of the amplitude of the fiscal policy cycle by showing—for
six different measures of government spending—the difference be-
tween the change in real government spending when GDP growth is
above the median and when it is below the median. Under this defini-
tion, a positive amplitude indicates procyclical government spending.
The inflation tax is also included as the remaining fiscal indicator, with
a negative amplitude denoting a procyclical tax rate. As argued in Sec-
tion 2, government spending and the inflation tax rate provide the best
indicators to look at in terms of their ability to discriminate among dif-
ferent cyclical policy stances (recall Table 3). Other indicators—such as
fiscal balances or tax revenues—convey less information.
The striking aspect of Table 9 is that, as shown in the last column,
the amplitude of the fiscal spending cycle for non-OECD countries is
considerably large for all measures of government spending. This sug-
gests that, in particular for the two middle income groups, fiscal policy
is not only procyclical, but markedly so. In contrast, while positive, the36 ' Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
analogous figures for OECD countries are quite small, suggesting, on
average, an acyclical fiscal policy.
Based on the country-by-country computations of the amplitude of
the fiscal spending cycle underlying Table 9 (which are illustrated in
Figure 3), the conclusion that non-OECD countries are predominantly
procyclical is overwhelming. For instance, for real central government
expenditure, 94 percent of low-income countries exhibit a positive
amplitude. For middle-low income countries this figure is 91 percent.
Every single country in the middle-high income category registers as
procyclical. In contrast, when it comes to OECD countries, an even
split exists between procyclical and countercyclical countries.
Turning to the inflation tax rate, n/(l + n), it registers as procyclical
in all of the four groups. The amplitude is the largest for the low-
income group (3 percentage points) and the smallest for OECD coun-
tries (0.9 percentage point).
2
0 Not surprisingly, the increase in the
inflation tax rate is the highest during recessions (13.1 percent) for
the middle-high-income countries (which include chronic high infla-
tion countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) and lowest for the
OECD, at 5.4 percent.
Table 10 presents the pairwise correlations for the expenditure mea-
sures shown in Table 9 as well as for the inflation tax rate. With regard
to the correlations between the cyclical components of GDP and gov-
ernment expenditure, the most salient feature of the results presented
in Table 10 is that for the three developing country groups, all of the
36 correlations reported in the table (18 correlations per filter) are posi-
tive regardless of the expenditure series used or the type of filter. By
contrast, all of the 12 correlations reported for the OECD are negative
(though low). This is not to say that the relationship between the fiscal
expenditure and business cycle is an extremely tight one; several
entries in Table 10 show low correlations that are not significantly dif-
ferently from zero—consistent with an acyclical pattern as defined in
Table 2. When one examines these results, however, it becomes evident
that for non-OECD countries (at least according to this exercise), fiscal
policy is squarely procyclical.
2
1
In terms of the inflation tax, the results for both filters coincide; the
correlation between the cyclical components of GDP and the inflation
tax is positive and significant for OECD countries (indicating counter-
cyclical fiscal policy) and negative and significant for all groups of
developing countries (indicating procyclical fiscal policy).When It Rains, It Pours 37
Table 10 also presents evidence on the relationship between capital
inflows and fiscal policy. Our premise is that the capital flow cycle
may affect macroeconomic policies in developing countries, particu-
larly in the highly volatile economies that comprise the middle-high-
income countries. To this end, we report the correlations (using both
the HP and bandpass filters) of the cyclical components of the fiscal
variables and net capital inflows. Remarkably, all but one of the 36
correlations (18 per filter) for non-OECD countries are positive with
21 of them being significantly different from zero. This provides
clear support for the idea that the fiscal spending cycle is positively
linked to the capital flow cycle (stylized fact 4.) The evidence is par-
ticularly strong for middle-high-income countries (with 10 out of
the 12 positive correlations being significant). We do not pretend, of
course, to draw inferences on causality from pairwise correlations, but
it is not unreasonable to expect that a plausible causal relationship may
run from capital flows to fiscal spending—an issue that clearly war-
rants further study. More surprising is the evidence suggesting that
the relationship between the fiscal spending cycle and capital flows
is also important for low income countries (most of which have little
access to international capital markets). It may be fruitful to explore to
what extent this result may come from links between cycles in com-
modity prices and government expenditure.
2
2 In sharp contrast to
developing countries, the correlations for OECD countries are—with
only one exception—never significantly different from zero, which
suggests that there is no link between the capital flow cycle and fiscal
spending.
Table 10 also indicates that the inflation tax is significantly and nega-
tively correlated with the capital flow cycle for all developing countries
(and both filters). Our conjecture is that inflation provides a form of
alternative financing when international capital market conditions de-
teriorate. For OECD countries, this correlation is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero.
4.3 Monetary Policy
To document stylized fact 3 (i.e., monetary policy is countercyclical in
most OECD countries while it is mostly procyclical in developing
ones), we perform the same kind of exercises carried out for the fis-
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Table 11






















Increases in nominal interest rates





































































Notes: Increases in interest rates are defined as the average annual change in interest
rates (with interest rates expressed in percentage points). Good (bad) times are defined
as those years with GDP growth above (below) the median.
* The median is reported in lieu of the average because the average is distorted by one or
more very high inflation (or hyperinflation) episodes.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics.When It Rains, It Pours 41
described in Section 2. Table 11 presents the same exercise performed
in Table 9 for the five nominal interest rate series used in this study.
As discussed in Section 2, a short-term policy instrument, such as the
interbank rate (or in some countries the T-bill or discount rate), is the
best indicator of the stance of monetary policy. In this case, a negative
amplitude denotes procyclical monetary policy. The difference be-
tween the OECD countries and the other groups is striking. For the
OECD countries, interest rates decline in recessions and increase in
expansions (for example, the interbank interest rate falls on average
0.7 percent or 70 basis points during recessions). In sharp contrast,
in non-OECD countries, most of the nominal interest rates decline in
expansions and increase in recessions (for instance, interbank rates
in middle-high-income countries rise by 2.3 percent or 230 basis points
in recessions). Thus, the pattern for the non-OECD group is broadly in-
dicative of procyclical monetary policy.
2
3
Table 12 presents the correlations of the cyclical components of real
GDP, capital inflows, and the five nominal interest rates introduced in
Table 11. In terms of the cyclical stance of monetary policy, the evi-
dence seems the most compelling for OECD countries (countercyclical
monetary policy), where all 10 correlations are positive and seven sig-
nificantly so. There is also evidence to suggest procyclical monetary
policy in middle-high-income countries (all ten correlations are nega-
tive and four significantly so). The evidence is more mixed for the
other two groups of countries where the lack of statistical significance




Turning to the correlations between net capital inflows and interest
rates in Table 12, the evidence is strongest again for the OECD coun-
tries (with all 10 correlations significantly positive), clearly indicat-
ing that higher interest rates are associated with capital inflows. For
middle-high-income countries, 8 out of the 10 correlations are negative
but not significantly different from zero (again, shorter time series are
an important drawback). Still, we take this as suggestive evidence of
the when-it-rains-it-pours syndrome.
Given the notorious difficulties (present even for advanced countries
such as the United States) in empirically characterizing the stance of
monetary policy, we performed a complementary exercise as a robust-
ness check for all income groups. Specifically, we estimated the Taylor
rule specified in Section 2. Table 13 reports the results for the three42 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
Table 12













































































































Notes: An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics.
nominal interest rates that are, at least in principle, more likely to serve
as policy instruments (interbank, T-bill, and discount.) Recalling that
countercyclical policy requires a positive and significant /?2, the main
results are as follows.
2
5 First, monetary policy in OECD countries
appears to be countercyclical (as captured by positive and significant
coefficients in two out of the three specifications). Second, there is
some evidence of monetary policy procyclicality in middle-income
countries (as captured by the negative and significant coefficients for
the T-bill regressions). This overall message is thus broadly consistent
with that of Tables 11 and 12.When It Rains, It Pours 43
Table 13
Taylor rules
Regression it = a + fix (nt - n) + /?2yf
c + ut
it — Short term interest rate. Definitions of the rates are given below
nt — n = Inflation rate minus sample mean
y



























































Notes: The equations have been estimated using panel data with fixed effects.
* Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics.
4.4 Exchange Rate Arrangements, Capital Market Integration, and
Crises
In the remainder of this section, we divide the sample along three dif-
ferent dimensions to assess whether our results are affected by the
degree of capital mobility in the world economy, the existing exchange
rate regime, and the presence of crises. First, to examine whether the
increased capital account integration of the more recent past has
affected the cyclical patterns of the variables of interest, we split our
sample into two subperiods (1960-1979 and 1980-2003) and per-
formed all the exercises described earlier in this section. Second, we
break up the sample according to a rough measure of the de facto
degree of exchange rate flexibility. Last, we split the sample into44 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
currency crisis periods and tranquil periods. This enables us to ascer-
tain whether our results on procyclicality are driven to some extent by
the more extreme crises episodes. The results for each of these parti-
tions—which are presented in Table 14—will be discussed in turn.
2
6
4.4.1 1960-1979 Versus 1980-2003
The four main results that emerge from dividing the sample into 1960-
1979 and 1980-2003 are the following. First, capital flows are consis-
tently procyclical in both periods, with the correlation increasing in the
latter period for middle-high-income countries. Second, the cyclical
stance of government spending does not appear to change across peri-
ods for non-OECD countries (i.e., fiscal policy is procyclical in both
periods) but OECD countries appear to have been acyclical in the pre-
1980 period and turn countercyclical in the post-1980 period. Third, the
inflation tax appears to be essentially acyclical in the pre-1980 period
only to turn significantly countercyclical for OECD countries and pro-
cyclical for the rest of the groups in the post-1980 period. Fourth, mon-
etary policy seems to have switched from acyclical to countercyclical
for OECD countries. Lack of data for developing countries precludes a
comparison with the earlier period.
4.4.2 Fixed Versus Flexible Exchange Rates
This partition assesses whether the cyclical patterns in net capital in-
flows and macroeconomic policies differ across exchange-rate regimes
(broadly defined). To this effect, we split the sample into three groups
(a coarser version of the five-way de facto classification in Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2004). The fixed-exchange-rate group comprises the exchange
rate regimes labeled 1 and 2 (pegs and crawling pegs) in the five-way
classification just mentioned. The flexible-exchange-rate group com-
prises categories 3 (managed floating) and 4 (freely floating). Those la-
beled freely falling by the Reinhart and Rogoff classification (category
5) were excluded from the analysis altogether.
The main results to come out of this exercise are as follows. First,
there are no discernible differences in the correlations between net
capital inflows and real GDP cycles across the two groups. Second, no
differences are detected either for government spending. Third, the in-
flation tax appears to be more countercyclical for OECD countries and
more procyclical for non-OECD countries in flexible regimes. Last,
monetary policy is more countercyclical for the OECD group under
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4.4.3 Crisis Versus Tranquil Periods
We define currency crashes as referring to a 25 percent or higher
monthly depreciation that is at least 10 percent higher than the previ-
ous month's depreciation. Those years (as well as the two years follow-
ing the crisis) are treated separately from tranquil periods. The idea is
to check whether our main results are driven by the presence of crises.
Table 14 suggests that this is definitely not the case. Indeed, our results
appear to hold also as strongly—if not more—in tranquil times. We
thus conclude that the paper's message does not depend on our having
crises periods in our sample.
5. Concluding Remarks
We have studied the cyclical properties of capital flows and fiscal and
monetary policies for 104 countries for the period 1960-2003. Much
more analysis needs to be undertaken to refine our understanding of
the links among the business cycle, capital flows, and macroeconomic
policies, particularly across such a heterogeneous group of countries
and circumstances (and especially in light of endemic data limitations).
With these considerations in mind, our main findings can be summa-
rized as follows:
1. Net capital inflows are procyclical in most OECD and developing
countries.
2. Fiscal policy is procyclical for most developing countries and mark-
edly so in middle-high income countries.
3. Though highly preliminary, we find some evidence of monetary
policy procyclicality in developing countries, particularly for the
middle-high-income countries. There is also some evidence of counter-
cyclical monetary policy for the OECD countries.
4. For developing countries—and particularly for middle-high-income
countries—the capital flow cycle and the macroeconomic cycle rein-
force each other (the when-it-rains-it-pours syndrome).
From a policy point of view, the implications of our findings appear
to be of great practical importance. While macroeconomic policies in
OECD countries seem to be aimed mostly at stabilizing the business
cycle (or, at the very least, remaining neutral), macroeconomic policies
in developing countries seem mostly to reinforce the business cycle,
turning sunny days into scorching infernos and rainy days into torren-When It Rains, It Pours 47
tial downpours. While there may be a variety of frictions explaining
this phenomenon (for instance, political distortions, weak institutions,
and capital market imperfections), the inescapable conclusion is that
developing countries—and in particular emerging countries—need to
find mechanisms that would enable macro policies to be conducted in
a neutral or stabilizing way. In fact, evidence suggests that emerging
countries with a reputation of highly skilled policymaking (the case of
Chile immediately comes to mind) are able to graduate from the pro-
cyclical gang and conduct neutral/countercyclical fiscal policies (see
Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003). In the particular case of Chile,
the adoption of fiscal rules specifically designed to encourage public
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expenditure on wages and salaries
General or consolidated government:
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expenditure minus interest payments,
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3. Monetary
Domestic credit, MO, Ml, M2, interbank
rate, treasury bill rate, discount rate,















Note: WEO uses the concept of central and general government expenditure, while GFS
uses central government budgetary accounts and consolidated government accounts.Table 16




















































































































Note: The total number of countries is 104. Iceland and Luxembourg are not included
in our sample of OECD countries and Korea is included in the middle-high income
countries.When It Rains, It Pours 49
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that our empirical objective has
consisted in computing reduced-form correlations in the data (in the
spirit of the real business cycle literature) and not in identifying policy
rules or structural parameters. The types of friction that one would
need to introduce into general equilibrium models to explain the
when-it-rains-it-pours syndrome identified in this paper should be the
subject of further research. In sum, we hope that the empirical regular-
ities identified in this paper will stimulate theoreticians to reconsider
existing models that may be at odds with the facts and empiricists to
revisit the data with more refined techniques.
6. Appendix
Table 15 shows the data sources for our data set. Table 16 lists the
countries included in our study.
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1. See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) for an analysis of borrowing/default
cycles.
2. Of course if bad times are defined exclusively as currency or banking crises, then
there is a small but growing theoretical literature on monetary policy in general and in-
terest rate defenses in particular. See, for instance, Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee
(2001) and Lahiri and Vegh (2003). The empirical evidence in this area is, however, rather
inconclusive.
3. For a discussion of some of the challenges in estimating monetary policy rules for in-
dustrial countries, see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
4. Throughout this paper, business cycle refers to the real gross domestic product (GDP)
cycle.
5. Lane and Tornell (1998) offer some empirical evidence to show that saving in Latin
American countries has often been countercyclical (i.e., saving falls in good times, and
vice versa).50 Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Vegh
6. Section 4 presents evidence in support of this hypothesis. See also Neumeyer and Perri
(2004), who examine the importance of country risk in driving the business cycle in
emerging economies.
7. It is important to notice that, under this definition, a procyclical fiscal policy implies a
negative correlation between tax rates and output over the business cycle. Our terminol-
ogy thus differs from the one in the real business cycle literature in which any variable
positively (negatively) correlated with the output cycle is referred to as procyclical (coun-
tercyclical).
8. It is worth emphasizing that, in deriving the theoretical correlations below, the only
assumption made is that the tax base (output or consumption) is high in good times and
low in bad times. This is true by definition in the case of output and amply documented
for the case of consumption. Aside from this basic assumption, what follows is an ac-
counting exercise that is independent of any particular model.
9. By the same token, it would also seem unwise to define procyclical fiscal policy as a
negative correlation between output and the fiscal balance (as is sometimes done in the
literature) since a zero or even positive correlation could also be consistent with procycli-
cal fiscal policy, as defined above.
10. We are, of course, fully aware that there is certainly no consensus on whether the in-
flation tax should be thought of as just another tax. While the theoretical basis for doing
so goes back to Phelps (1973) and has been greatly refined ever since (see, for example,
Chari and Kehoe, 1999), the empirical implications of inflation as an optimal tax have
received mixed support. See Calvo and Vegh (1999) for a discussion.
11. A negative correlation between real interest rates and output would arise in a stan-
dard endowment economy model (i.e., a model with exogenous output) in which high
real interest rates today signal today's scarcity of goods relative to tomorrow. In a pro-
duction economy driven by technology shocks, however, this relationship could have
the opposite sign. In addition, demand shocks, in and of themselves, would lead to
higher real interest rates in good times and vice versa. Given these different possibilities,
any inferences drawn on the cyclical stance of monetary policy from the behavior of real
interest rates should be treated with extreme caution.
12. If, as part of a procyclical monetary policy, policymakers lowered reserve require-
ments, this should lead to even higher real money balances.
13. In practice, however, using domestic credit to measure the stance of monetary policy
is greatly complicated by the fact that inflation (especially in developing countries) tends
to be high and variable. Hence, a large growth rate does not always reflect expansionary
policies. For this reason, in the empirical section, we will restrict our attention to short-
term nominal interest rates as a policy instrument.
14. Our data set covers 104 countries for the period 1960-2003 (the starting date for each
series varies across countries and indicators). See Table 14 for data sources and Table 15
for the list of countries (both tables are in the appendix).
15. Based on data for 33 poor countries over a 25-year period, Pallage and Robe (2001)
conclude that foreign aid has also been procyclical, which is consistent with our overall
message.
16. We also found that for both groups of middle-income countries, the current account
deficit is larger in good times than in bad times, which is consistent with procyclical cap-
ital flows.When It Rains, It Pours 51
17. See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003).
18. The Institutional Investor Index (III) ratings, which are compiled twice a year, are
based on information provided by economists and sovereign risk analysts at leading
global banks and securities firms. The ratings grade each country on a scale from 0 to
100, with a rating of 100 given to countries perceived as having the lowest chance of
defaulting on government debt obligations.
19. Tables 8,10,12, and 14 report the average country correlation for the indicated group
of countries. We use a standard t-test to ascertain where the average is significantly dif-
ferent from 0.
20. Figures on the inflation tax are multiplied by 100.
21. In terms of the country-by-country computations underlying Table 10, it is worth
noting that for, say, real central government expenditure, 91 percent of the correlations
for developing countries are positive (indicating procyclical fiscal policy), whereas 65
percent of the correlations for OECD countries are negative (indicating countercyclical
fiscal policy), as illustrated in Figure 2.
22. In this regard, see Cuddington (1989).
23. Appendix Tables 3 and 4 in the working paper version of this paper show results
analogous to those in Table 11 for real interest rates and real monetary aggregates, re-
spectively. Broadly speaking, real rates for OECD countries show a positive correlation
with the cycle (i.e., they generally rise in good times and fall in bad times). This is, in
principle, consistent with countercyclical monetary policy (recall Table 3). In contrast, for
middle-high and middle-low-income countries, real interest rates appear to be negatively
correlated with the cycle. These results are consistent with those reported in Neumeyer
and Perri (2004). The results for low-income countries are harder to interpret as they are
more similar to those for OECD countries. The results for real money balances in Appen-
dix Table 4 are in line with our priors—with real money balances rising more in good
times than in bad times. This positive correlation, however, does not allow us to draw
any inference on the stance of monetary policy (recall Table 3).
24. It is important to warn the reader that the data on interest rates for non-OECD coun-
tries is spotty and rather incomplete. Our results should thus be interpreted with caution
and as merely suggestive.
25. As an aside, notice that the coefficient on the inflation gap is always positive and
significant.
26. To conserve on space, Table 14 presents results for only one measure of government
spending and one interest rate using the HP filter. The remaining results are available
upon request from the authors.
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This paper is an extremely nice effort at documenting and contrasting
certain features of the business cycle for a large set of countries. The
authors focus on the cyclical properties of capital flows, fiscal policy,
and monetary policy. They contrast the behavior of these variables
across groups of countries defined to be OECD, middle-high, middle-
low, and low-income countries. The middle-high-income countries are
the so-called emerging markets (EM). Based on their analysis, the
authors identify a striking feature that appears to characterize EMs.
That is, in good times (when output is above trend), EMs receive
above-average levels of capital flow from the rest of the world at the
same time as fiscal and monetary policies are strongly expansionary.
This feature, which the authors describe as when it rains, it pours, is
either not true or less true of other countries in the sample. We are
then presented with a seemingly unique feature of EMs that seeks an
explanation. This paper is a nice source for facts on EMs that will disci-
pline future theoretical research and call for further empirical research
on the facts themselves.
In my comments, I will briefly examine and summarize the evidence
and then proceed to present a perspective on emerging markets that
will help us in interpreting the facts. My main comment will be to em-
phasize that what we call the business cycle in an EM is very different
from the cycle in a developed economy. In the case of the latter, we
typically think of the output process as characterized by a fairly stable
trend and transitory fluctuations around this trend. In the case of
EMs, in contrast, the trend is highly volatile and this dominates the
volatility of transitory shocks. This characterization captures the fre-
quent switches in regimes that EMs endure, often associated with
clearly defined changes in government policy, including dramaticComment 55
changes in monetary, fiscal, and trade policies. There is a large litera-
ture on the political economy of emerging markets in general, and the
tensions behind the sporadic appearance of progrowth regimes in par-
ticular, that is consistent with a volatile trend (see, for example, Dorn-
busch and Edwards, 1991). Once we recognize this difference in the
business cycle, several features of the data that this paper documents
appear to be less puzzling. It also informs our inference of causation
between variables. Most of my comments arise from work I have done
jointly with Mark Aguiar (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2004a; Aguiar and
Gopinath, 2004b).
1. Empirical Findings
The main empirical findings are the following. First, capital flows into
developing countries tend to be more strongly procyclical than in the
case of OECD countries. Second, several measures of government fiscal
policy appear to be markedly procyclical in developing countries com-
pared to OECD countries. Ideally, one would like to examine jointly
several measures of fiscal policy to examine the stance of fiscal
policy. It is possible, for instance, that even if income tax rates stay
unchanged, governments might try harder to fight tax evasion in good
times (as a part of reform), implying a tighter fiscal policy. The only tax
measure the authors employ is the inflation tax rate, mainly restricted
by data availability. A fruitful exercise will be to put together evidence
on other measures of taxation and alternate fiscal instruments.
The third finding is that in the case of EMs, the fiscal spending cycle
is positively linked to the capital flow cycle. However, the magnitude
of these correlations appear to be sensitive to the filtering procedure
used and in some cases are quite small. The last finding relates to mon-
etary policy. As the authors acknowledge, measuring the policy com-
ponent of monetary aggregates is a tricky problem. The evidence that
the authors find is that short-term interest rates are negatively corre-
lated with the business cycle in EMs. This contrasts with interest
rates in OECD countries, which are positively correlated with the cycle.
The behavior of domestic interest rates in EMs is strikingly similar to
the behavior of interest rates at which EMs borrow from the rest of the
world. Neumeyer and Perri (2004) document a strong negative correla-
tion between interest rates on dollar-denominated debt and the busi-
ness cycle in EMs. This behavior of interest rates is consistent with the
market response to changing default probabilities over the business56 Gopinath
cycle. I will say more about this later. The main point, however, is that
for the evidence on monetary policy more empirical work must be
done to provide conclusive evidence on the stance of monetary policy.
2. Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle Is the Trend
The question of what is the business cycle in emerging markets is
explored here. A standard representation of the production function is
where Kt is the level of the capital stock and Lt is the labor input. The
variable zt represents transitory shocks to productivity and follows an
AR(1) process.
Zt = pzZt-i + £f
2
ef ~ N(0,az), \pz\ < 1. Vt represents the stochastic trend productivity;
gt is the growth rate of trend output.
rt = g
ln(gt) = (1 - pg) ]n(fig) + pg \n(gt-i) + ef
e?~N{0,ol),\pg\<l.
In Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b), we document that the ratio of vola-
tility of trend shocks to level shocks, (ag/az), is higher in an EM, such
as Mexico, compared to a developed small open economy such as
Canada. That is, unlike developed markets, fluctuations at business
cycle frequencies in EMs are driven primarily by trend shocks as
opposed to transitory level shocks. Figure 1 plots log GDP for three
small open economies (SOE)—Canada, Mexico, and Argentina. The
plot for each economy includes the log level of GDP (where we have
extracted any significant seasonal component) and the stochastic trend.
The latter was calculated using the methodology of King, Plosser,
Stock, and Watson (1991). To be precise, the trend is obtained by set-
ting the transitory shocks to zero and feeding only the permanent
shock through the system. This should not be confused with equating
the trend to the random walk component a la Beveridge and Nelson
(1981). Casual observation of the plots suggests that Canada, our
benchmark developed SOE, experiences relatively small fluctuations
around a stable trend. On the other hand, Mexico and particularly Ar-
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high frequencies. We find that at business-cycle frequencies (12 quar-
ters), the fraction of output variance explained by permanent shocks in
the case of Canada is around 50%, while the same number for Mexico
is 82%, supporting the view that the cycle is the trend for these
markets.
3. Capital Flows, Interest Rates, and Macroeconomic Policies
The first empirical finding in the paper that capital flows (current
accounts) are more strongly procyclical (countercyclical) in EMs is
then a natural implication of a standard real business cycle model
wherein the stochastic trend is the main shock. The current account
(negative of capital flows) is the difference between national saving
and national investment. In response to a positive transitory shock to
productivity (z), investment rises. All else being equal, this will cause
the current account to worsen. In response to a transitory shock, how-
ever, savings also rise since agents wish to smooth consumption. The
savings effect then counters the investment effect and the current ac-
count is less countercyclical or acyclical. For developed markets, where
we view the trend to be stable, one would expect little cyclically of the
current account. On the other hand, the response to a positive trend
shock, g, will be for savings to fall on impact. Agents experience higher
income following this shock but expect income to increase even more in
the future (as they enter a new growth regime). Consequently, savings
will fall on impact. Now, the current account will be more strongly
countercyclical, as the authors find in this paper for EMs. Figure 2 plots
the current account against the standard deviation of the growth rate
of real GDP for 28 small open economies. There is a clear negative rela-
tion between the trade balance (as a ratio of GDP) and the volatility
of the growth rate. Countries with more volatile growth rates (in the
group of middle- and high-income small open economies), the EMs,
tend to have more countercyclical trade balances.
Our view on the role of the trend in EMs also resonates in evidence
that this paper documents on the behavior of international credit rat-
ings in Tables 6 and 7. The authors find that it is precisely the middle-
income countries that experience the biggest swings in ratings across
good and bad states of nature. Since credit ratings incorporate the
probability of default, a switch from a high-growth regime to a low-
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ability to repay and consequently should affect ratings more substan-
tially compared to transitory shocks.
The question then is, What underlies the regime switches we observe
in EMs? One can argue for the role of government policy here. Argen-
tina's adoption of the currency board at the start of 1990 that brought
an end to years of hyperinflation in the economy is one such regime
switch. In this case, interpreting any causal link running from capital
flows to fiscal policy becomes tricky. The finding that inflation tax rates
are countercyclical (Table 9) could precisely be the regime change that
then attracts capital flows into the economy. The negative correlation
between capital flows and inflation tax for EMs is consistent with this.
Other forms of regime switches involve privatizations and nationaliza-
tions that can dramatically affect productivity. For instance, Restuccia
and Schmitz (2004) provide evidence of a 50% drop in productivity
in the petroleum industry in Venezuela within five years of its nation-
alization in 1975. Similarly, Schmitz and Teixeira (2004) document
almost a doubling of productivity in the Brazilian iron-ore industry fol-
lowing its privatization in 1991.
Last, I will comment on the countercyclicality of interest rates and
the positive correlation between interest rates and the current account.60 Gopinath
As mentioned earlier, strong evidence suggests the countercyclicality
of dollar interest rates at which EMs borrow from the rest of the world.
This same literature documents that dollar interest rates and the cur-
rent account are positively correlated. That is, EMs borrow more in
good times and at lower interest rates. In Aguiar and Gopinath (2004a),
we describe a model of sovereign default and show that this relation
among interest rates, current account, and GDP follows directly when
an economy is subject to trend shocks. Put simply, in a high-growth re-
gime, agents wish to borrow (as they face an upward-sloping income
profile). All else being equal, this should raise interest rates because
higher levels of debt raise the probability of default. In an economy
subject to trend shocks, however, the positive trend shock has the ef-
fect of lowering interest rates at all levels of debt. Consequently, it is
possible that the economy pays a lower interest rate on its borrowing.
We show that this is a more likely scenario in an economy subject pri-
marily to trend shocks as opposed to transitory shocks around a stable
trend.
To conclude, this paper presents us with interesting business-cycle
features of EMs that tend to contrast with the experience of developed
markets. While this paper significantly enhances our knowledge of the
fiscal and monetary cycles in countries, more empirical work remains
to be done in further documenting these facts. In interpreting these
facts, it is important to bear in mind that the underlying income
process in EMs and developed markets are quite different. Once this
is taken into account, contrasting features of EMs appear to be less
puzzling.
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1. Introduction
The classical literature points to countercyclical policy responses
as means to moderate the cost of business cycles. While the pre-
scription of the theory is clear, this behavior is rarely observed in prac-
tice. Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh's (KRV) paper documents, quite
convincingly, that emerging markets suffer from acute procyclical
policies—hence their title "When It Rains, It Pours." Although this be-
havior had been highlighted before in the case of fiscal policy, KRV
extend the years, number of countries, and variables included in the
analysis, and they find, overwhelmingly, that procyclical behavior is a
generalized feature of emerging markets. An important contribution
of KRV is the analysis of which macroeconomic indicators are appro-
priate to the measurement of the procyclical behavior. However, is
the procyclical behavior a reflection of different shocks hitting the
economies, or is it the outcome of wrong choices by policymakers? If
it is the first, then it is unclear why we should care about procyclical-
ity. Nevertheless, if it is the second, then something could—or
should—be done.
The preliminary evidence shown in these comments is that most of
the differences across countries is due to the dissimilar shocks hitting
them and not to their diverse responses to the same shocks. In other
words, emerging markets are more procyclical because they are usu-
ally hit by shocks that create positive comovement among the variables
of interest.
These comments are organized as follows. First, I reproduce the styl-
ized facts in KRV (using their data) but presenting the results in a
different fashion. Second, I try to address the reasons behind the pro-
cyclical behavior. I explore first the issues of endogeneity and then theComment 63
more general problem of the different mixture of shocks. Finally, I
present some concluding remarks.
2. Procyclical Policies
Although KRV study several dimensions of procyclical policy—
monetary, fiscal, etc.—in these comments, I concentrate entirely on fis-
cal policy, and in particular on real expenditures. This is a small part
of the analysis performed by KRV, but I believe it is enough to pro-
vide the intuition, and highlight the issues, that I would like to con-
centrate on.
Standard macroeconomic theory implies that government consump-
tion should be smoothed through the business cycle to lessen the sever-
ity of the macroeconomic fluctuations. In this sense, therefore, it should
be expected that fiscal policies follow a countercyclical pattern. A
closer look at the data suggests that reality is far from this theoretical
paradigm.
Using yearly data on real gross domestic product (GDP) and real to-
tal expenditures for more than 100 countries from 1960s to today (same
data as KRV), I computed the correlation between output and total
expenditures country by country. In the original version of KRV, they
mostly concentrated on the average of such correlation, which is what
most of the literature does. To clarify the points behind my discussion,
I have preferred to look at the estimate country by country, sorting the
data from the lowest to the largest coefficient.
1 The results are shown
in Figure 1. The countries in light gray are the developed economies,
while the countries in dark gray are the developing countries.
As can be seen, not all developed economies have a negative correla-
tion, although they are mostly located on the left side of the graph. In-
deed, if we were to compute the average correlation in the sample, we
would find that it is easy to accept the hypothesis that the correlation
of developed countries is statistically smaller than that of developing
countries. This is exactly what KRV do.
This result is also confirmed if, instead of using the level of ex-
penditure, I compute the correlation of output and expenditure share
(defined as the total expenditures as a percentage of GDP). In this
case, the pattern is not exactly the same, but the final message is iden-
tical. In Figure 2, the same figure as before is reproduced, but expendi-
ture shares are used instead of total expenditures. Again, developed
economies are mostly located in the left part of the figure, suggesting64 Rigobon
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that their fiscal policies are less procyclical than those in developing
countries.
This pattern is so strong that it is found not only in correlations—as
has been done here and in KRV—but it is also found using other mea-
sures of comovement. For example, estimating the simple regression
gt = ayt + £t country by country and plotting the OLS coefficients pro-
duces exactly the same pattern. Figure 3 presents the results. As can be
seen, the pattern across all three figures is almost identical. Developed
economies are always located to the left of the figure, regardless of
how the comovement is computed. These figures confirm what KRV
find formally in the comparisons of simple correlations across groups.
3. What Does This Mean?
3.1 Endogeneity
It is important to clarify that even though the correlations have differ-
ent signs, it does not imply that countries react differently to output
shocks, which is usually the claim in the literature. In other words, this
pattern of correlations can be explained either because the endogenous
response of fiscal policy to output shocks is different between devel-
oped and developing countries, or because the shocks that hit these
economies are by themselves dissimilar. Although, this point should
be trivial, unfortunately, most of the empirical literature favors the first
interpretation and gives little attention to the second.
2 Starting from
the original contribution by Gavin and Perotti (1997), the literature
is mostly devoted to the argument that the coefficients in the policy
reaction functions of developing economies are different from those of
developed economies. Assume that equation (1) represents the fiscal
policy reaction function. Then the discussion of procyclicality centers
around the signs of the coefficient a.
gt = ccyt + et (1)
The claim—or implicit argument—is that developed economies have
countercyclical policies, i.e., oc is negative, while developing economies
have procyclical policies and a is negative.
Certainly this has been underscored in the literature. First, the vo-
racity effect of Lane and Tornell (1996) is one of the theories in which
the difference between emerging and developed economies is in theComment 67
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sign of the coefficients. In this case, the political process does not
allow for savings to take place during booms; therefore, fiscal policy
moves with external shocks or output. Second, the theory based on
credit-constrained governments indicates that a positive correlation
exists between expenditures and output because during booms, the
constraint is relaxed. As before, this theory has a direct implication on
the size and sign of the coefficients in equation (1).
Although a different sign on the coefficients is a distinct possibility,
this is not the conclusion that should be extracted from the evidence.
Not at all! For example, regarding the relationship between fiscal
expenditures and output, it can be claimed that equation (1) is only
one side of the economy. It describes the decision of the fiscal authority
in reaction to a transitory movement of output, and the residuals of
that equation represent the fiscal shocks to which the economy is sub-
jected. However, it should also be clear that an output equation, where
fiscal expenditures affect output, exists as well:
yt=Pgt + m (2)
The residuals in equation (2) represent, for instance, productivity
shocks. We have plenty of evidence that /? > 0.
If these two equations describe the economy, it should be obvious
that it is possible to obtain very different correlations even though the
parameters remain the same. In other words, it is possible that a coun-
try could have a positive correlation between fiscal expenditures and
output, even with a < 0. The reason is simply because that country
could be subjected to mostly fiscal shocks. A simple exploration of
these two equations provides a clearer view of the importance of the
relative variances as a source of the counter- and procyclical policies
in developed and emerging markets. Equations (1) and (2) imply a
reduced form given by
If /? > 0 and a < 0, then the productivity shocks create negative correla-
tions, while the fiscal shocks produce positive correlations.
Can the different variance of the shocks be the explanation of
the observed pattern of correlations in the data? To evaluate theComment 69
importance of this explanation, we must solve the problem of endoge-
neity. Nevertheless, without further assumptions, the problem cannot
be solved. However, there is a proxy. We can compute the relative var-
iances of expenditures and output, and compare them. Under the as-
sumption that the absolute value of both coefficients is smaller than 1,
then a higher ratio of volatility of fiscal shocks to productivity shocks
should be accompanied by a larger ratio between the variances of
expenditures to output.
I show this ratio in Figure 4.1 computed the proportion between out-
put volatility and expenditures volatility. The conjecture is that coun-
tries subject to larger productivity shocks will experience negative
correlations between expenditures and output, while countries that ex-
perience primarily fiscal shocks will have positive correlations. As can
be seen in Figure 4, developed economies have variance-of-output
to variance-of-expenditure ratios that are much larger than those
in developing countries.
3 This is in line with the conjecture that coun-
tries with negative correlation experience it because they are subject
to a higher share of output shocks than are those that have positive
correlations.
This is the ratio of the endogenous variables and not the ratio of the
variances of the structural shocks. To answer the question fully, further
analysis and the resolution of the simultaneous equations problem are
required. One alternative is to find an instrument to estimate equation
(1) properly. To be valid, however, this instrument has to be correlated
with output but not with government expenditures. Few variables in-
deed satisfy these requirements. Two come to mind: terms of trade
(TOT) and output of major trading partners.
Both variables are subject to critique. On the one hand, TOT might
enter the expenditure equation directly, making it a bad instrument.
The reason is that several countries in the sample are heavy commod-
ity exporters, and a sizable proportion of the government revenues
come from that sector. In those circumstances, an improvement in the
TOT increases government revenues and likely will increase expendi-
tures as well. TOT has been weakly correlated historically with output;
hence, even if it does not enter the expenditure equation, it still suffers
from the weak instruments problem. On the other hand, the output of
major trading partners term has its own problems. First, the relation-
ship between the output of trading partners and domestic output is
unclear. It depends on the degree of substitubility of the exports and
on the elasticity of exports to foreign demand. There is no reason why70 RigobonComment 71
these effects should be the same across countries; not even their signs
should be the same. In the end, assuming that the model has constant
coefficients will make the variable a weak instrument.
Gali and Perotti (2004) have studied the implications of using output
from trading partners as an instrument. They indeed find that most of
the differences in correlations are due to changes in the mixture of
shocks and not to different coefficients. They study only European
countries, and we expect them to be similar to start with; thus, their
results cannot be extrapolated to the rest of the world. Nevertheless,
they are suggestive.
In this section, I concentrate on the TOT. As I have already men-
tioned it is a weak instrument and therefore the results should be taken
cautiously. Estimating equation (1) using the TOT as instrument and
sorting the coefficients, we find that there is no pattern between the
coefficients and the countries. Figure 5 presents the results. Notice that
the developed countries (the light gray bars) are spread all over, and
the pattern we found in previous exercises is lost.
This evidence suggests that the difference across the two groups—
developing versus developed countries—is mainly in the relative vari-
ance of the shocks and not in the average coefficients. Indeed, the hy-
pothesis that the average coefficients in the instrumental variables
estimation are different across the two groups cannot be rejected.
3.2 Latent Factors
In the previous subsection, I concentrated entirely on the problem of
simultaneous equations. However, this should be only a small part of
the problem, assuming that only two types of shocks are hitting the
economy: productivity and fiscal. In reality, expenditures and output
are driven by a much more complex set of factors that can affect posi-
tive comovement. In this section, I explore a different model. I allow
for several factors explaining output and expenditures. The model is
as follows:
2=1 i-n+1
2=1 i=n+l72 RigobonComment 73
where all y > 0 and it has been assumed that expenditure and output
are driven by m different shocks. The first n creates positive comove-
ment, and the later ones create a negative correlation. Notice that this
model encompasses the simultaneous equation model discussed be-
fore. The questions we are interested are twofold: can we explain the
different patterns of correlations across countries by appealing only to
the heteroskedasticity of the shocks and keeping the coefficients con-
stant among the two groups of countries? And if not, how different
are the coefficients?
In order to answer these questions, we are forced to make strong
assumptions. The model, as it is, is not identified. I will make the fol-
lowing assumptions: (1) four groups of countries (as in KRV) are
ordered by their degree of development; (2) the countries in each of
the groups share the same coefficients, but I allow the coefficients to
be different across groups; (3) heteroskedasticity exists in the data; and
(4) within each group, all latent factors affect positively or negatively
the same coefficient.
The first two assumptions are relatively uncontroversial. The first
one is the dimension we are interest in studying. The second one is
implicitly assuming that we should concentrate on the average coeffi-
cient within each group. The third assumption is easily checked in the
data and therefore we will do so. The fourth assumption, on the other
hand, is perhaps the strongest one. It is indeed assuming that the
model to be estimated is the following:
i=n+l
i=\ i=n+l
In other words, to be able to estimate this model, we have to summa-
rize all the factors that create positive comovement within one single
factor, as well as collapsing the factors that create negative comove-
ment in a single factor. Therefore, the changes in the coefficients are




1 = 1 i'=n+l
If we assume that (yz- — 7i) and (yt•. — y2) are orthogonal to the fac-
tors, then we can estimate the model using identification through
heteroskedasticity.
4 The idea of the procedure is to use the hetero-
skedasticity in the data to generate enough equations to solve the
problem of identification.
The idea is that we have to estimate:
where, et and rjt are the factors in the previous equations. In this model,
the only statistic we can compute from the sample is the covariance
matrix of the observable variables. However, this covariance matrix is
explained by four unknowns: y\-,y2, and the variances of st and rjt. This
is the standard identification problem in simultaneous equations—
there are fewer equations (moments in this case) than the number of
unknowns. Algebraically, the covariance matrix of the reduced form is:
where the lefthand side can be estimated in the data, and in the right-
hand side we have the theoretical moments. Assume that the data can
be split in two sets according to the heteroskedasticity of the residuals,
i.e., that the residuals in these two sets have different variances. Re-
member that in the original model, we have already stipulated that the
coefficients are the same across all observations. In these two subsam-
ples, we can estimate two variance-covariance matrices:
Q, =
71*12 72tf,2 7l*e,2 ~ 72*\,2
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This implies that now six moments can be estimated in the sample,
which are explained by six coefficients: the two parameters of interest
and four variances. Notice that there are as many equations as there
are unknowns. In the standard literature on system of equations, this
means that the system satisfies the order conditions. To solve the prob-
lem fully then, we have to verify that the six equations are linearly
independent—which is known as the rank condition. Under our
assumptions, we know that both coefficients of interest are positive.
Obviously, the estimation requires the existence of heteroskedasticity.
The sufficient conditions are discussed in Sentana and Fiorentini (2001)
and Rigobon (2003a).
The countries were divided in the four groups studied by KRV. The
idea is to estimate the coefficient for each group and then compare the
coefficients. One advantage of the methodology is that the coefficients
and, but also the variances are estimated, and hence a comparison be-
tween the relative variances of the groups can be performed.
When the groups were split, group 1 did not exhibit enough hetero-
skedasticity to be estimated. Instead of pooling the countries into
group 2—which clearly is a possibility—I decided just to drop the
countries because this will make for a better comparison with the pa-

























The first set of rows shows the coefficient for the factors that create
positive comovement. The first row is the point estimate, and the sec-
ond row is the standard deviation. As can be seen, for groups 2, 3, and
4, the point estimates are very well estimated (the t-stats are large for
all of them), but the point estimates are close among the groups. In-
deed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are the same. Group 4
(the developed economies) has a smaller coefficient, but the difference
is not statistically significant.
The second set of rows estimates the coefficient on the factor that
creates negative comovement. As before, the first row is the point76 Rigobon
estimate, and the second row is the standard deviation. The estimates
are also precise, although the coefficient on group 4 is not statisti-
cally significant. As in the case of the previous coefficient, it is impossi-
ble to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same across
groups.
This evidence should suggest that the reason for the different corre-
lations in the sample is mainly due to changes in the relative impor-
tance of the shocks. Indeed, comparing the ratio of positive to negative
shocks across the sample, we find that in group 4, the shocks that cre-
ate positive comovement have a variance that is 2.08 times larger than
negative comovement factors. However, groups 2 and 3 have a relative
variance of 4.47 and 4.55, respectively, indicating that the sources of
positive comovement are clearly more important in groups 2 and 3
than in developed countries.
Last, as a source of additional evidence that the relative variance is
what explains the pattern of correlations observed in the data, let me
compute the correlation in developed countries (only) using rolling
windows of 10 years. These correlations are shown in Figure 6. As can
be seen, the time-series variation of the correlations is as strong as the
cross-country variation we have shown before. If we were to ask our-
selves what explains the changing pattern of correlations in the time
series, we would say that different variances are at stake. Indeed, this
would be the first choice. And if this is the first choice for the time se-
ries, why have we neglected it as the first choice for the cross-section?
4. Conclusion
Clear evidence supports the strong procyclical behavior in fiscal and
monetary policy in emerging markets. This is confirmed in KRV, and I
can substantiate it with another 100 regressions. The purpose of KRV is
to document these facts, and they have done a superb job. On the other
hand, the purpose of this comment has been to indicate or guide to-
ward possible explanations behind those facts. Are emerging markets
more procyclical because their economies are subject to a different mix-
ture of shocks, or because they react differently to them?
The preliminary evidence in this paper (which coincides with Gali
and Perotti, 2004) is that the most important source of the differences
is in the variances and not the coefficients. Obviously, in the process I
have made a lot of sometimes unreasonable assumptions. Future re-
search should be devoted to study these aspects further.Comment 77
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Notes
1. Indeed, Section 4 in the paper now has adopted this procedure to highlight the pat-
terns in the data.
2. There are some notable exceptions, such as Gali and Perotti (2004), which indeed
make this exact same point within the procyclical policies of European countries.
3. Indeed, Gali and Perotti (2004) make a similar point for the case of European
countries.
4. For the theoretical derivations, see Rigobon (2003a), Sentana (1992), and Sentana and
Fiorentini (2001). Applications where the heteroskedasticity is modeled as a GARCH pro-
cess are found in Caporale et al. (2002a), Rigobon (2002b), Rigobon and Sack (2003b).
Applications where the heteroskedasticity is described by regimes shifts are found in Rig-
obon (2002a, 2003b), Rigobon and Sack (2003a), and Caporale et al. (2002b). Applications
to event study estimation are developed by Rigobon and Sack (2002) and Evans and
Lyons (2003). Finally, several application to panel data can be found in the literature. Ho-
gan and Rigobon (2002) apply the method to a very large panel data to estimate the
returns to education. Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) study instead the impact of institution
on income, and how the different types of institutions are affected by income levels and
the degree of openness of the country. Klein and Vella (2003) also use heteroskedasticity
to estimate the returns to education. Broda and Weinstein (2003) use the inequality con-
straints, together with the heteroskedasticity, to estimate the elasticities of substitution
in models of trade to evaluate the gains from variety. Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2003)
use the identification through heteroskedasicity method to identify the impact of external
debt on growth. Hviding, Nowak, and Ricci (2003) investigate the impact of official
reserves on exchange-rate volatility. Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004) estimate the impact
of openness on growth.
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Several of the participants commented on Roberto Rigobon's point re-
garding the distinction between the endogenous and exogenous com-
ponents of fiscal policy. Jordi Gali pointed out that one instrument that
had proven useful in estimating these fiscal policy rules was the gross
domestic product (GDP) of a large trading partner because it is not cor-
related to domestic fiscal shocks and there is some common compo-
nent in the cycle. Gali remarked that in a recent paper he co-authored
with Roberto Perotti, the use of this instrument showed that most of
the acyclical or procyclical behavior responded to the exogenous com-
ponent, while the endogenous component was largely countercyclical.
Alan Stockman added that it was important to look at the GDP of
a country in relation to the GDP of the world and of its trading part-
ners rather than at the GDP alone. Michael Woodford said that if
one looked at permanent innovation in real GDP and assumed that
exogenous changes responded necessarily to something other than
monetary or fiscal policy, one could determine to what extent the cor-
relation was in fact due to endogenous responses of monetary or fiscal
policy to the level of real activity. He believed that by using this instru-
ment, one could conclude that developing countries had a procyclical
policy.
Mark Gertler also agreed with Rigobon that it was important to
distinguish between impulse and propagation, but he expressed reser-
vations in considering that big fiscal adjustments were purely exoge-
nous. He believed that important fiscal adjustments did not take place
for reasons completely unrelated to what was happening in the econ-
omy, and he said that it would be interesting to consider the institu-
tions of these countries. As an example, he cited the exchange regime
and the importance of distinguishing between fixed and floatingDiscussion 81
regimes to analyze policy responses. If a country were on a fixed re-
gime, it would not be able to use monetary policy and this might be
one factor leading to a big fiscal adjustment.
The participants also commented on the differences between the pol-
icies of developed and developing countries. David Backus disagreed
with the suggestion that there was a need to look at the recent period
as different from the 1970s, and rather we could look as far back as the
data could go to show that developed countries in the nineteenth cen-
tury had more volatility in output and much more countercyclical net
exports. He suggested analyzing the fiscal policy behavior of these
countries then and looking for similarities with developing countries
today. Harald Uhlig suggested looking at the different roles of gov-
ernment in OECD countries and emerging market economies. While
Rigobon's argument could lead to the conclusion that governments
used fiscal policy as a stabilizer—in other words, that a government
spent more on unemployment during a recession, for example—
governments in emerging market economies had to spend on build-
ing infrastructure such as roads, telephone systems, new buildings,
etc.
Fabrizio Perri suggested that in counties such as Argentina, procycli-
cal fiscal policies might respond to the fact that these countries needed
to attract capital flows. During a financial crisis, these flows dry out,
and countries cut government expenditures because it is the only way
to attract capital. The fact that they had limited access to capital mar-
kets might be part of the driving force of fiscal reactions to cyclical
variations.
In response to the comments, Carmen Reinhart welcomed the sug-
gestion of a break in the recent period as very useful and acknowl-
edged that although the authors were constrained in their data, they
were aware of the differences before and after financial liberalization
periods. She said that they were very confident that the only thing that
came close to identifying a more structured approach was their estima-
tion of the Taylor rules. She recognized that they were aware that on
the fiscal side, they had only come to establish a set of correlations and
did not really address what types of shocks were driving these correla-
tions. She disagreed with Rigobon on the need to look for a three-way
relationship that included capital flows when trying to identify the
shocks. She argued that they did not consider capital flows to be exog-
enous. In the paper, it was explained how capital flows could be82 Discussion
driven by exogenous shocks and affected by factors such as exchange
rates, among others.
Reinhart acknowledged that finding an appropriate instrument was
a major challenge. She also explained that at this stage, they did not in-
tend to estimate policy feedback rules, which she believed was the next
step, but rather to establish the striking differences.